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1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), commanders were hard pressed to 
determine exactly what the contractors were supposed to do and how to provide the 
requisite supervision and coordination of contractors while in-theater.  As a result, lack of 
contractor accountability ensued.  Within this context in mind, a thesis was conducted 
with the intent to provide recommendations to allow a framework for planning within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) by allowing a greater role of the Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan (CCSP) within the Joint Planning Process (JPP).  This research was 
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) while being monitored by Dr. Cary A. 
Simon and R. Marshall Engelbeck, Colonel, USAF (Retired). 
The use of contractors on the battlefield is not a new concept.  In fact, U.S. forces 
have received contract support on every major battlefield since the American Revolution 
to present day conflicts in Iraq.  The very nature of this contract support has evolved in 
response to the needs of its customers over time.  It was not until the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars that the growing role of contractors had a direct impact on the nature of the 
logistical capabilities within the battlefield.  Furthermore, it was not until the first Gulf 
War and subsequent conflicts in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq 
that the full impact of contracting on the battlefield reached its fruition.  The growth of 
contractor support on the battlefield has led to concerns of proper coordination of support 
to the warfighter, accountability of dollars spent, and supervision of contractors while in-
theater.   
Inclusion of a Contracting Officer (CO) in the planning cells could ensure 
proactive, responsive and flexible support of the Joint Operation Plan (OPLAN) in a 
timely manner.  A well-written CCSP can incorporate the probability of success where 
supported units can concentrate on the prosecution of operations.  However, the CCSP is 
not always factored in the planning process, and supporting units may end up reacting to 
events that could have been avoided.  It can also be argued that the growing importance 
of the CCSP should result in it playing a more prominent role in the planning process as a 
2separate annex of the OPLAN and not an appendix to the Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN) 
annex.   The purpose of the CCSP is to define the needs of the Combatant Commander 
(COCOM) immediately so as to provide the CO enough time to conduct battlefield 
procurement in an efficient and effective manner.  The use of Logistics Civilian 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts is an attempt to be proactive but the efforts 
fall short in terms of what is actually required by the COCOM.  The ability to leverage 
time stems from the involvement of CO’s in the Joint planning cells from the beginning 
of the planning cycle and the integration of the CCSP with supporting plans within the 
Joint OPLAN.  It is this ability to leverage time early on that makes the CCSP a force-
multiplier when contracting on the battlefield; resulting in better coordination and 
accountability of contractors in battle.  
3I. INTRODUCTION   
A. BACKGROUND  
Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSPs) describe the support required in 
the event of the rapid deployment of military forces in response to the spectrum of 
hostilities ranging from Major Theater Warfare (MTW) to Lesser Regional Conflicts 
(LRC).  Within the Joint arena, Contracting Officers (COs) are responsible for the 
procurement of combat support, combat service support, or other logistical or supply 
support not organic to deployed units.  They are pivotal players in the procurement 
process who can obligate government funds for supplies or services.  Doctrinally, the CO 
is designed to complement or supplement the logistics supply system and the Host Nation 
Support (HNS) system available to the deployed commander’s forces.  The vehicle for 
detailing this type of logistical support is the CCSP.  The CO’s input may be an often-
neglected segment of mission planning.  This can cause unfavorable impacts during the 
execution phase of an operation.   
Within the Joint and multi-national level, Operation Plans (OPLANS) describe 
what is to be accomplished in support of mission requirements.  Supporting Logistics 
Plans (LOGPLANS), in contrast, delineate how to get to the fight and how to sustain the 
warfighters, but do so in general terms.  If contained within the LOGPLAN, CCSPs 
provide logistical planners specific details on how to support operations without 
sacrificing flexibility and responsiveness for logistical or supply items not organic to 
operating forces.  A better fit or congruence of CCSPs within the Joint LOGPLAN of the 
OPLAN may provide better support to Combatant Commanders (COCOM), and act as a 
force-multiplier during any operation in support of the National Military Strategy (NMS) 
or National Security Strategy (NSS).  By virtue of the increasing dollar amounts spent 
and the rise in the number of contracts awarded for operations since Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm (ODS/DS), COs could play an vital role if formally included in the planning cells 
at the Joint level of planning.  They could provide a level of detail to better support 
operations in any conflict.  
4The end of the Cold War and events since September 11, 2001 has forced the 
Services to respond to increasing regional threats from rogue nation-states and terrorist 
organizations.  The composition and capabilities of forces are undergoing substantial 
change.  The proliferation of change increasingly includes the processes and procedures 
that support operating forces fighting in an uncertain global environment.  Using current 
vernacular, mandated transformation must also propagate throughout the planning 
process.  This research examines the extent to which CCSPs are included in 
LOGPLANS.  The purpose of the study is to obtain a more flexible and responsive force 
capable of operating along any juncture of the spectrum of hostilities.  
 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH  
The objective of this research was to examine the Joint Planning Process (JPP) in 
terms of the substantial role of CCSPs in the Joint LOGPLAN and the overall OPLAN.  
The research focuses on the JPP, CCSPs, and regulations governing contingency 
contracting operations in the Joint arena.  The study provides Department of Defense 
(DoD) planners with recommendations on how to better utilize CCSPs within Joint 
OPLANS/LOGPLANS.  It provides supported units with a template for receiving 
detailed contracted logistical support instead of general contracted logistical support 
while in-theater.  Additionally, the research discusses how the Services currently plan and 
operate within the Joint contingency environment, including recommendations for 
improvements. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions are:  What is an expanded role of Contingency 
Contracting Support Plans (CCSP) in the Joint Planning Process (JPP), specifically 
relating to supporting Logistics Plans (LOGPLANS) and Operation Plans (OPLANS)? 
Why does the JPP, by doctrine, not include CCSPs as an annex within the Joint OPLANS 
or as an appendix within the Joint LOGPLANS?  The subsidiary research questions are: 
5What does the JPP entail?  What is the extent of integration between LOGPLANS and 
OPLAN? 
What can CCSPs offer logistical planners by its formal inclusion into Joint                    
OPLANS/LOGPLANS?  Additionally, what level of detail does the CCSP offer?  Can it 
provide leverage for the COCOM to consolidate requirements, “certify” legitimate buyers 
due to security requirements, and de-conflict procurement with Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs)? 
How should the CCSP be formally included into the JPP, e.g., as a separate   
annex within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution (JOPES) OPLAN/CONPLAN 
format; contained within the LOGPLAN Annex (Annex D)? 
What is the changing role of Contracting Officers (CO) in terms of formal 
inclusion in Joint level planning cells, including in-theatre assessments and Combatant 
Commanders (COCOM) intent? 
How can coordination between the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and 
COs be improved?    
 
D. SCOPE  
This thesis analyzes the JPP within DoD as it pertains to the growing importance 
of contingency contracting and CCSPs within the Joint operating environment.  It 
analyzes the increased number of awarded contracts and money spent to support 
operations including Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Lesser Regional 
Conflicts (LRCs), Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), and Major Theater Wars (MTWs).  
Recommendations are provided on how DoD planners, Contracting Officers (COs) and 





6E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research includes a literature review of prior 
research, Joint OPLANS and LOGPLANS of past and current operations, relevant 
articles, CD-ROM systems, and other library information databases about the JPP, 
CCSPs, and contingency contracting.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
one senior planner at the Joint Staff, J4 Headquarters, United States Marine Corps 




It is assumed throughout this thesis that the reader has a general knowledge of the 
JPP, CCSPs, and the regulations and statutes that guide acquisitions and procurement 
during contingencies in a Joint environment.  It is also assumed that due to the sensitive 
nature contained in Joint OPLANS and LOGPLANS of past and current operations that 
any items contained within those documents were not disclosed or compromised in any 
form or fashion during the conduct of this thesis research.  Any sensitive information 
reviewed is discussed in general terms and no specific information or material utilized in 




Most of the information contained in this thesis research is sourced from the Joint 
LOGPLAN (i.e., the Logistics Annex of the Joint OPLAN) of operations conducted in 
Iraq.  Due to the sensitive nature of the information contained in these source documents, 
any information from those sources contained within this thesis research are abstract and 
do not reveal the conduct of operations by U.S. or coalition forces while in-theater.  
Additionally, a review of this thesis research was conducted by the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) Security Manager to ensure that sensitive information contained within the 
body of work has been “sanitized.”   
7H. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
The following definitions are provided to facilitate the understanding of 
contingency contracting issues within the JPP:   
 
Combatant Commander (COCOM) – A Commander-in-Chief of one of the 
unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. [Ref. 1:  p. 
GL-3]   
Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) – An operation plan in an abbreviated format that 
would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert into an OPLAN or 
OPORD, which contains the CINC’s strategic concept. [Ref. 2:  GL-3]     
Contingency – An emergency involving military forces caused by natural 
disasters, terrorists, subversions, or by required military operations.  [Ref. 3:  p. 2] 
Contingency Contracting – Direct contracting support to tactical and operational 
forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and Military Operations 
Other Than War, both domestic and overseas.  It includes Major Regional 
Conflicts, Lesser Regional Conflicts, MOOTW, and Domestic 
Disaster/Emergency Relief.  [Ref. 4:  p.2]  
Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) – A Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan ensures that contracting plans are carried out in response to:  disaster 
relief efforts; rapid deployment logistics support; support of deployed U.S. or 
allied forces outside CONUS.  A CCSP ensures that contracting receives proper 
emphasis in all logistics planning.  [Ref. 5:  p. 7-15]  
Contracting – Purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise obtaining supplies or 
Services from non-Federal sources.  Contracting includes descriptions (but not 
requirement determinations) of supplies and services required solicitation and 
selection of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract 
administration.  It does not include making grants or cooperative agreements.  
[Ref. 6:  p. 1]    
8Crisis Action Planning (CAP) – Crisis Action Planning or Time Sensitive 
Planning is conducted in response to crises where U.S. interests are threatened 
and a military response is being considered.  While deliberate planning is 
conducted in anticipation of future hypothetical contingencies where prudence 
drives a planning requirement, CAP is carried out in response to specific 
situations as they occur and that often develop very rapidly.  Thus, in CAP, the 
time available for planning is reduced to as little as a few days.  The overall 
process of CAP parallels that of deliberate planning, but is much more flexible to 
accommodate requirements to respond to changing events and National 
Command Authorities (NCA) requirements.  CAP procedures promote the 
logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses of 
action (COA), and communication of reports and recommendations from 
combatant commanders up to the NCA and decisions from the NCA down to 
combatant commanders.  [Ref. 7:  p. GL-5]    
Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) – Deliberate Planning or Peacetime Planning 
is the process used when time permits the total participation of the commanders 
and staffs of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).  Development 
of the plan, coordination among supporting commanders and agencies and the 
Services, reviews by the Joint Staff, and conferences of JPEC members can take 
many months, possibly the entire two-year planning cycle, to develop a large 
plan, though continued JOPES Automated Data Processing (ADP) improvements 
should reduce the time required.  [Ref. 8:  p. GL-5]  
Joint Operation Planning Execution System (JOPES) – The purpose of the Joint 
Operation Planning Execution System is to bring both deliberate and Crisis 
Action Planning (CAP) into a single system architecture to reduce the time 
required to do either, make the refined results of deliberate planning more readily 
accessible to planners in CAP, and more effectively manage any plan during 
execution.  [Ref. 9:  p. i]    
9Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) - The Joint Planning and 
Execution Community is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the commands and agencies 
involved in the training, preparation, movement, employment, support, and 
sustainment of forces in a theater of operations.  [Ref. 10:  p. GL-7]      
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) - The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
provides strategic guidance, including apportionment of resources (for planning 
purposes) to the Commander-in-Chief’s (CINCs) and the Chiefs of the Services, 
to accomplish assigned strategic planning tasks, based on current military 
capabilities, for the next 18 to 24 months.  The JSCP provides a coherent 
framework for capabilities-based operations planning.  The JSCP is the principal 
vehicle by which the CINCs are tasked to develop operational plans.  It provides:  
(1) a summary of the current national military strategy for deterrence and war, 
general strategic taskings to the CINCs, and the strategic direction required to 
coordinate the efforts of the CINCs in the attainment of national military 
objectives; (2) planning guidance to the CINCs governing the development of 
plans and security assistance recommendations to support the national military 
strategy; (3) planning guidance to the Services and Defense agencies for 
supporting the CINCs in the execution of assigned objectives and tasks; (4) 
strategic taskings to the CINCs specifying, where appropriate, the plans required 
for contingencies; (5) a listing of major combat forces expected to be available 
during the plans’ effective period under various conditions of mobilization and 
apportionment of those forces to the CINCs for planning; (6) Service- and force-
unique information and limitations on the use of specific forces as required to 
meet plan taskings; and (7) an intelligence estimate for planning.  [Ref. 11:  p. 
GL-8] 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) – LOGCAP plans for the use 
of civilian contractors to support contingencies or to augment the combat service 
support force structure of selected forces.  [Ref. 12: p. 14.14-14.5]   
Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN) – Logistics Planning System; Annex D (Logistics 
Support Plan) of the Joint OPLAN.  [Ref. 13 (JP 1-02:  p. A-74] 
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National Command Authorities (NCA) – The President and the Secretary of 
Defense or their duly deputized alternates.  [Ref. 14: p. GL-9]      
Operation Order (OPORD) – A directive used by a commander to subordinate 
commands for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. 
[Ref. 15: GL-9]      
Operations Plan (OPLAN) – An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations 
that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order.  This identifies 
the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept and a 
movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations.  OPLANS will 
include all phases of the tasked operation.  [Ref. 16: p.GL-9]      
 Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data List (TPFDDL) - A transportation 
feasible database containing all the forces, materiel, and personnel required to 
execute and support the COCOM’s concept of operations, phased into the area of 
operations at the places and times required by the CINC’s concept. It is an 
expression of the CINC’s concept of operations through the scheduled 
deployment of forces and sustainment required to execute it. [Ref. 17: p. 7-12]   
 
I. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
 Chapter I outlines the structure and direction of the thesis.  It discusses the 
objectives, scope, assumptions, limitations, organization, and key terms.  Chapter II 
provides an overview of the JPP, JSCP, JOPES and CCSPs within DoD.  Chapter III 
explores contracting and logistics issues in terms of historical costs conducted for 
military operations from World War I (WWI) to the present day.  Chapter IV analyzes the 
possible realignment of the CCSP within the JPP in terms of the costs for contracting on 
the battlefield.  Chapter V provides conclusions, recommendations, and areas for future 
research on the topic.   
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II.   OVERVIEW OF THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS (JPP),         
JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP), JOINT 
OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES), & 
THE CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT PLAN (CCSP) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the Joint Planning Process (JPP) within the Department 
of Defense (DoD).  The first section provides a general background of the JPP at each 
level of planning.  The second section describes the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
(JSCP) and its importance within the planning process.  The third section reviews the 
automated data system or Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 
within DoD.  As such, it illustrates the importance of an automated system due to the vast 
amounts of information captured by planners in order to provide a cohesive operating 
document.  Lastly, this chapter delineates the importance of the Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan (CCSP) within the planning framework.  Its inclusion in the early stages of 
planning can detail the amount of contracting support required.  The premise is that early 
inclusion of the CCSP in the planning process will provide much needed responsiveness 
and flexibility to supported commanders while in-theater.  This responsiveness and 
flexibility may stem from the ability to consolidate and prioritize requirements, procure 
supplies at reduced costs through economies-of-scale, and de-conflict competition among 
units for the same scarce resources.  Additionally, the CCSP can act as a conduit to 
enable Contracting Officers (COs) to conduct market research and verify legitimate 
offers with Non-Government Organizations (NGO), the United Nations (UN), and 
embassy general services representatives; thereby leveraging contracting in support of the 
Combatant Commander’s (COCOM’s) Operation Plan (OPLAN).  
 
B. THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS (JPP)  
 The ability of the COCOM to execute an OPLAN stems from the JPP.  The JPP is 
a sequential process within the military operations planning framework.  It is performed 
simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war for both Deliberate 
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and Crisis Planning.  According to archived information contained at the General Dennis 
J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.html), 
these three levels are defined as follows: 
  1. Strategic Level - At this level, joint operation planning involves the 
development of strategic military objectives and tasks in support of national security 
strategy and the development of force and materiel requirements necessary to accomplish 
those tasks.  Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces 
and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national 
objectives. The National Command Authority (NCA) translates policy into national 
strategic military objectives.  These military objectives facilitate theater strategic 
planning.  A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with 
the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and with allies and 
coalition members.  The combatant commanders plan at the strategic level of war through 
participation in the development of national military strategy, the development of theater 
estimates, and theater strategies.  The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to 
both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater.    
2. Operational Level - Joint operation planning at the operational level links 
the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this 
level is on operational art--the employment of military forces to attain 
strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, 
integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and 
battles.  Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose 
major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition 
before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their 
commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles 
and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.        
3. Tactical Level - At the tactical level of planning, tactics is the employment 
of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of 
units in relation to each other and to the enemy in order to use their full 
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potential. Tactics are employed to fight and win engagements and battles.  
[Ref. 18]  
This ability to simultaneously plan and execute at all levels of the JPP requires detailed 
coordination among key players.  Additionally, it is essential that this coordination be 
seamlessly integrated with the overall efforts contained within the National Military 
Strategy (NMS).  The JPP is summarized in Exhibit 1 shown below:  
Exhibit 1.  Summary of the Joint Planning Process.  From [Ref. 19: p. 7-10] 
 
C. JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP) 
Embracing the Secretary of Defense call for “transformation”, DoD’s focus of 
planning was realigned from a threat-based model to a capabilities-based model.  The 
threat-based model focuses on Who the enemy is and Where we will fight him.  The 
capabilities-based model, in contrast, focuses on What the enemy can do.  [Ref. 20]  As 
such, the JSCP is a capabilities-based plan developed by the Joint Staff to provide 
guidance to the COCOM on objectives, specific planning tasks, apportionment of forces, 
































the JSCP represents the National Security Strategy (NSS) developed by the NCA, 
National Military Strategy (NMS) developed by the JCS, and the input provided into the 
JOPES database from the entire Joint Planning and Execution Committee (JPEC).  The 
end result of the JSCP process is the development of the OPLAN.  [Ref. 21: p. 7-5] Upon 
further study, the JSCP framework can be further broken-down into two types of 
planning cycles:  Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning (CAP).   
In the Deliberate Planning Process (DPP), time permits the total participation of 
the JPEC to develop and coordinate the plan among commanders in the Joint arena.  This 
type of coordination among the COCOM and supporting commanders and agencies can 
take months and even years.  Additionally, deliberate planning is conducted in 
“anticipation of future hypothetical contingencies where prudence drives a planning 
requirement.” [Ref. 22: p. 7-7]     
In contrast, CAP is time-sensitive in nature.  This type of planning is conducted in 
response to crises where U.S. interests are threatened and a military response may be 
required within days.  It has been noted that, “CAP is carried out in response to specific 
situations as they occur and that often develop very rapidly… [where] procedures 
promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses 
of action (COA), and communication of reports and recommendations” up and down the 
communication chain directly between the NCA and the COCOM in the form of 
Operation Orders (OPORDs).  [Ref. 23: p. 7-7]   
 A breakdown of the differences between the DPP and the CAP Process and a 
summary of both processes is contained in Exhibit 2.    
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 Crisis Action Planning Deliberate Planning 
Time Available to Plan Hours or days 18-24 months 
JPEC Involvement For security reasons, possibly very limited using 
close-hold procedures 
Participates fully 
Phases Six Phases from Situation Development to Execution 
Five Phases from Initiation 
to Supporting Plans 
Document Assigning 
Tasks 
WARNING ORDER to 
CINC; CINC assigns tasks 
with EVALUATION 
REQUEST message* 
JSCP to CINC: CINC 
assigns tasks with planning 
or other written directive  
Forces for Planning ALLOCATED in the WARNING, PLANNING, 
ALERT, or EXECUTE 
ORDER 
APPORTIONED in JSCP
Early Planning  
Guidance to Staff 




Planning Directive issued 
by CINC after planning 
guidance step of concept 
development phase 
Commander’s Estimate Communicates recommendations of CINC 
to the CJCS/NCA 
Communicates the CINC’s 
DECISION to staff and 
subordinate commanders 
Decision on COA NCA decide COA CINC decides COA with review by CJCS 
Execution Document EXECUTE ORDER When an operation plan is implemented, it is 
converted to an OPORD, 
and executed with an 
EXECUTE ORDER 
Products Campaign plan (if required) with supporting 
OPORD, or OPORD with 
supporting OPORD 
OPLAN or CONPLAN 
with supporting plans 
Exhibit 2. CAP and DPP comparison. From [Ref. 24: p. 7-9] 
 
Note:   *Commander-in-Chief (CINC) is no longer used for military commanders except in reference to  
the President of the United States.  They are now referred to as Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMs). 
 
An observation is that both processes of Deliberate Planning and CAP parallels that of 
the Boyd Cycle model where commanders and planners at the Joint-level observe and 
gather information on its capabilities, orient on the threat, decide how to respond, take 
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immediate action on the threat, and adjust decisions based on constant feedback as events 
unfold as seen in Exhibit 3. [Ref 25]  







Exhibit 3. Simplified Boyd Cycle Model. From [Ref. 25: p. 102] 
 
CAP, however, is much more flexible than the DPP when responding to changing 
events and NCA requirements.  Despite these differences, however, both planning cycles 
delineate the ability to prosecute combat operations along the entire spectrum of conflict 
in regards to fulfilling objectives set forth by the COCOM in support of the NMS.  In 
1967, concerning the Korean War, General Mathew B. Ridgway observed:   
But in truth, the larger the command, the more time must go into planning; 
the longer it will take to move troops into position, to reconnoiter, to 
accumulate ammunition and other supplies, and to coordinate other 
participating elements on the ground and in the air. To a conscientious 
commander, time is the most vital factor in his planning. By proper 
foresight and correct preliminary action, he knows he can conserve the 
most precious elements he controls, the lives of his men. So he thinks 
ahead as far as he can. He keeps his tactical plan simple. He tries to 
eliminate as many variable factors as he is able. He has a firsthand look at 
as much of the ground as circumstances render accessible to him. He 
checks each task in the plan with the man to whom he intends to assign it. 
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Then--having secured in almost every instance his subordinates' 
wholehearted acceptance of the contemplated mission and agreement on 
its feasibility--only then does he issue an order.  [Ref. 26] 
 
As will be revealed later on in this research, the common weakness of both processes is 
likely the lack of fit in not including the CCSP as a separate annex to the Joint OPLAN.  
[Ref. 25: p. 102]   
 
D. JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) 
JOPES is a combination of Joint policies and procedures (guidance), and 
automated data processing (ADP) support used to plan and execute Joint military 
operations.  Although JOPES has been used for over 20 years to support the development 
of operations plans and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), the current 
automated system was given its first real baptism by fire in Operation Desert Shield to 
assist in managing a real world operational deployment.  Since then, JOPES ADP has 
been used in virtually every deployment.  [Ref. 27: p. 1]   
In the conduct of planning at the Joint-level, the usage of the JOPES ADP can 
reduce the time required to develop a large plan for both deliberate and crisis action 
planning.  Information that is fed into the JOPES single system architecture reduces the 
time required to “refine results of deliberate planning more readily accessible to planners 
in CAP, and more effectively manage any plan during execution.”  [Ref. 28: p. 7-9]  A 
by-product of JOPES for both planning processes is the TPFDDL. Three important 
aspects of the TPFDDL delineate transportation, personnel and materiel support.  In 
regards to transportation in the TPFDDL, transportation requirements on how to get to the 
fight and how to prosecute the fight once forces are in-theater.  Additionally, for 
personnel and materiel support, specific units and support items are earmarked for 
deployment, although, requirements may change as plans are further defined.  The result 
of the JOPES outputs are the annexes that comprise of the JOPES OPLAN format 
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K Command, Control, and
Communications Systems
L Environmental Considerations
M Mapping, Charting, and
Geodesy
N Space Operations
P Wartime Host-nation Support
Q Medical Services
S Special Technical Operations
X Execution Checklist
Z Distribution




Exhibit 4.  JOPES OPLAN Format.  From [Ref. 29: p. 7-11] 
 
However, as the premise of this study suggests, CCSPs play an insignificant role 
in the planning process.  By doctrine, they are not included in the JPP.  Their inclusion, 
though, can provide the COCOM a force-multiplier on the battlefield if introduced early 
on in the planning process.  Furthermore, the inclusion of the CCSP into the system 
architecture of JOPES ADP and the TPFDDL may reduce the cycle time of procurement 
during the planning, build-up and execution of an operation; produce enough of a lead 
time for a thorough research of available commodities and materiel; and provide the 
COCOM detailed logistical support of supplies or services that may be required in 
support of the OPLAN.   
 
19
E. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT PLAN (CCSP) 
 A CCSP ensures that contracting plans and procedures are aligned to the OPLAN 
via the LOGPLAN annex.  This subordinate role in the LOGPLAN as an appendix, 
however, should be analyzed in further detail.  The increasing amount of contracting 
actions conducted and dollar amounts spent on operations since hostilities in Kuwait in 
1991 call for a more focused interest into the growing primacy of the CCSP in the 
planning process.  The CCSP should be formally included, as a separate annex, in the 
Joint Planning Process (JPP).   
… from the National level all the way down to the unit level...but more 
often than not, Contracting Officers are not found in planning cells at the 
Major Command, CINC, Service and Joint Staff levels…[presenting] a 
special challenge to logistics planners - in the absence of a contracting 
staff officer close at hand, it is very easy to overlook the CCSP or to allow 
it to become out of date. [Ref. 30: p. 7-16]   
Additionally, for both the DPP and CAP Processes, the CCSP can be overlooked 
if COs are not included in the planning cells to participate, prepare, and review the 
OPLAN.  Only through appropriate planning can any disconnect between the CCSP, 
LOGPLAN and OPLAN be avoided.  According to the lessons contained in the Defense 
Acquisition University’s (DAU’s) CON 234 course, a solid CCSP can provide the 
COCOM the following: 
1.  Contracting-specific command and control relationships;  
            2.  The location/structure of the contracting office/sub-offices (to include which 
units will be supported by each activity). 
3. Procedures for appointing, training, and employing Ordering Officers (OO), 
Contracting Officer’s Representatives (COR), Disbursing Agents, and 
Government Contracting Purchase Card (GCPC) holders. 
4. Manpower, equipment and supplies required for contracting support and the 
deployment sequence. 
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5. Types of supplies, services, and construction customers can expect to receive 
through contingency contracting as well a list of any special prioritization or 
control measures for scarce commodities or services. 
6. Procedures for defining, validating, processing and satisfying customer 
requirements. 
7. Procedures for budgeting and payments to vendors. 
8. Procedures for closing out contracting operations and redeployment. 
9. Security requirements and procedures for contracting and contractor 
personnel. 
10. Specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions that apply to the 
supported operation. 
11. The concept of contracting operations that is phased and synchronized with 
the supported plan. 
12. The description and assessment of Host Nation agreements, customs, laws, 
culture, language, religion, and business practices which will impact on 
contracting operations. 
13. Environmental impacts of the operation (e.g., the U.S.’s or host nation’s 
environmental laws incorporated into the contracts or whichever is more 
stringent).  [Ref. 31: p. 7-17] 
With these lessons from CON 234 in mind, the two main actions within the CCSP 
stem from simply determining requirements and applying capabilities in support of the 
COCOM.  However, as simplistic as this may sound, the actual execution of contract 
support of an OPLAN reveals itself to be much harder in reality without the proper 
alignment of the CCSP with the OPLAN.   
Proper integration of the Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) within an 
organization allows the commander increased flexibility and quicker reaction time during 
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the deployment of U.S. forces abroad. This flexibility is translated into increased 
efficiency of forces in the theater of operations. Additionally, if the commander 
understands how best to employ contracting personnel, then he has increased his ability 
to overcome the obstacles that inevitably arise during any military operation. 
F. SUMMARY 
 The products of the DPP, CAP, OPLANS and OPORDS, establish the 
responsibilities for logistical, supply, and contracting support.  Inclusion of a CO in the 
planning cells could likely ensure proactive, responsive and flexible support of the 
OPLAN in a timely manner.  A well-written CCSP can incorporate the probability of 
success where supported units can concentrate on the prosecution of operations.  
However, as the upcoming analyses will show, the CCSP is not always factored in the 
planning process, and supporting units may end up reacting to events that could be 
controlled through proper, detailed planning.  Additionally, it can also be argued that the 
growing importance of the CCSP should result in it playing a more prominent role in the 
planning process as a separate annex of the OPLAN and not just an appendix to the 
LOGPLAN annex.  In The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Mintzberg stated that 
“planning’s grandest assumption of all—analysis can provide synthesis” falsely leads 
planners to believe that planning is an end state in and of itself.  [Ref. 32]    The problem 
in this case is much more systemic and the belief that charting “a course of action will 
provide a systematic solution to a complex web of demands” is not enough.  [Ref. 33] 
This systemic problem in planning was verified in an email from a Joint Staff, J-4 
Officer, who stated the following:   
Current OPLANS generally discuss how forces will be contractually 
supported in the theater.  The OPLAN for Iraq does this as do others.  I 
believe it is in Appendix D of the Logistics supplement to the OPLAN for 
IRAQ.  Now where we could use help is in analyzing the effectiveness of 
the plans with respect to contracting relationships/contingency contracting 
and if they are spelled out well enough to make support viable.  [Ref. 34]    
  
In light of the input provided by the aforementioned e-mail, further research conducted 
reveals that this statement is not entirely accurate.  A review of Appendix 9, Annex D of 
the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) OPLAN shows that the problems are more in depth 
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than the coordination and effectiveness in terms of contracting relationships/contingency 
contracting.  It is this analysis of source documents within the OIF OPLAN that reveal 
that these contracting issues of accountability, responsiveness, and planning can be 
adequately addressed by implementing the CCSP within any Joint OPLAN.  Data 
collected and analyzed in Chapter III and Chapter IV will reveal the historical importance 
of contract planning in terms of cost and personnel supported.  
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III. HISTORICAL DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes conflicts and contingency operations from a historical 
perspective.  A time-series analysis is conducted on past and current operations from a 
monetary aspect over time in terms of personnel and costs.  Cost, as related to available 
historical data, is the total cost of all direct and indirect expenses spent by the U.S. to 
prosecute military actions in support of its National Security Strategy (NSS).   This 
chapter provides a baseline from which to derive a comparative analysis in Chapter IV. 
 
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
ACTIONS  
Contracting on the battlefield is not a new endeavor.  The Services have been 
supported by contractors on every major battlefield since the American Revolution to 
Iraq.  The very “nature of the contract support has evolved over time”—from contingency 
contracting support (i.e., theater support contractors or operation-specific contracting and 
external support contractors or Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program [LOGCAP] 
contracting) to system contractors.  [Ref. 35] Due to this increased reliance on contractor 
logistic support to ease the burden of increasing operational tempo and drastic force 
reductions, this reliance has “left military commanders potentially vulnerable and 
dependent during times of crisis.” [Ref. 35] To illustrate this, Exhibit 5 traces the 






Exhibit 5:  Evolutionary Development of U.S. Contracting.  After [Ref. 35] 
 
This reliance on contracted services stems from the utilization of civilian wagon drivers 
hauling supplies for the Continental Army during the American Revolution to sutlers 
supporting Union troops during the Civil War.  By World War I (WWI) and World War 
II (WWII), civilian workers were hired to provide support services in all the theaters of 
war.  The Korean War saw a growing role of contractors providing “services ranging 
from stevedoring, road and rail maintenance to transportation.”  [Ref. 36] By the advent 
of the Vietnam War, “contractors were becoming a major part of logistical capabilities 
within zones of operation providing construction, base operations, water and ground 
transportation, petroleum supply and maintenance/technical support for high-technology 
systems.”  [Ref. 36] During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (OSD/DS), 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) estimates of the war captured information on the 
deployment of 5,000 U.S. government civilians and 9,200 contractor employees 
“deployed in support of U. S. Forces providing maintenance for high-tech equipment in 
addition to water, food, construction and other services.”  [Ref. 36] As such, this 
exponential growth of contractor support during contingency operations in Bosnia has 
















































[Ref. 36] According to Gordon L. Campbell of the Combined Arms Support Command 
located at Fort Lee, Virginia, this “increased use of civilian contractors should not be 
surprising.”  [Ref. 36] Mr. Campbell also stated the following: 
Today, U.S. Forces and budgets are down 40 percent relative to where  
they were in 1989.  For the Army, that’s 111 combat brigades reduced  
to 63.  Yet, since that time, the U.S. Army has deployed troops on 36  
occasions compared to 10 deployments during the 40-year Cold War.   
The Guard and Reserve have experienced the same draw downs:   
1.8 million soldiers in 1989 reduced to 876,000 today--all the while  
performing 13 times the man-days of service a year they contributed  
prior to the Soviet Union's demise.  The use of contractors to support  
military operations is no longer a ‘nice to have.’  Their support is no  
longer an adjunct, ad hoc add-on to supplement a capability.  Contractor  
support is an essential, vital part of our force projection capability--and  
increasing in its importance.  [Ref. 36] 
This increased reliance on contractors on the battlefield has resulted in three important 
lessons for Joint-level planners:   
 1.  The evolutionary emergence of contingency contracting has resulted in 
increased costs as a result of the drawdown of military support personnel and growing 
operational tempo.  
2.  Contracting on the battlefield will not go away, and the implementation of 
contract planning within the Joint Planning Process can provide the Combatant 
Commander (COCOM) flexibility and responsiveness to any contingency.  
3.  Proper planning and integration of contract planning will lead to increased 
supervision of contractors on the battlefield; resulting in reduced costs by 
providing the COCOM adequate levels of support without “mission creep” 
requirements of non-essential services. [Ref. 37] 
Given this historical input, a time-series analysis of past and current operations is helpful.  
The next section addresses these lessons learned in terms of personnel and cost along the 





C. TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF PAST/CURRENT OPERATIONS 
For the purposes of statistical analysis, a listing of the number of active-duty 
personnel involved in each operation and total cost along the spectrum of conflict ranging 
from Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs), Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), to Major 
Theater Warfare (MTWs) is provided for comparison over time.  The significance of time 
series data stems from the consistency of the patterns generated by data collected over 
several time periods.  [Ref. 38]    
  
Spectrum of Conflict 
The spectrum of conflict is defined as the range of hostilities from LRCs, MRCs, 
and MTWs.  The three types of conflicts are defined as follows: 
 
a. Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs) – Conflicts involving ongoing, imminent, or 
likely hostilities involving the U.S. military, but where there is less than 
substantial commitment of forces.  [Ref. 39]  Operation Restore Hope (ORH) 
is an example of a LRC.  
b. Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) – Conflicts where hostilities are ongoing, 
imminent or likely and where there is a substantial commitment of U.S. 
military forces. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/DS) are examples 
of MRC.  [Ref. 39]  
c. Major Theater Wars (MTWs) – Conflicts or hostilities based on Cold War 
doctrine where U.S. and allied forces are committed to aggression of the size 
and scope not unlike WWII (e.g., East Block countries).  [Ref. 40] 
 
These ranges of conflict have been summarized in relation to the conflict over 
time, number of personnel involved per year, and its cost per engagement as analyzed in 
Exhibits 6 through 9.   
2. Analysis of Personnel and Costs 
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In terms of personnel and cost, these ranges of conflict have been synopsized in 
terms of the duration of the operation over time, number of personnel involved per year, 
and its cost per engagement in terms of Fiscal Year 2001 (FY2001) dollars as revealed in 
Exhibits 6 and 7.  The only exceptions to this information are the dollar figures revealed 
for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  These 
operations are valuated using FY2002 dollars.  The inflationary differences between these 
fiscal years are negligible.  As such, an analysis of the data reveals a positive trend in the 
total active-duty military personnel over time prior to and during the Cold War.  After 
1992, however, there is a negative trend revealing a decline in total active-duty military 
personnel within the Services.  Given available historical data, in terms of total number of 
active-duty military personnel involved (e.g., U.S. military end-strength), Exhibit 6 starts 
from WWI to OEF/OIF, inclusive.     
U.S. Active Duty Military Personnel 

























































*Operation Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Strike,   
Desert Fox. 
**OEF/OIF in FY’02 dollars. 
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By contrast, in terms of cost, Exhibit 7 shows a time series analysis for the total 
cost of operations prosecuted since WWI. The data captured from these tables provides a 
graphic example contained in a time series analysis of personnel supported and its cost 
shown over time.   

























































Exhibit 7:  Total Cost  of Operations. After [Ref. 41, 43, & 44]  
       Notes: 
*Operation Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Desert 
Strike, Desert Fox.  
** OEF/OIF in FY’02 dollars. 
 
A descriptive analysis of Exhibit 7 reveals that MTW conflicts such as WWI, 
WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War lasted over three years and cost billions of 
dollars.  In contrast, smaller, shorter MRCs such as ODS/DS and OEF/OIF reveal that, 
despite the relatively lower total costs in comparison to those aforementioned wars, there 
is a positive trend that costs are increasing in terms of the ratio between personnel and 
cost.  Additionally, it can be extrapolated that if these engagements were to last over 
three years, subsequent costs would skyrocket and could easily match or exceed the 
bigger operations.  
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A reasonable question to ask is:  what is driving the cost?  It is a direct relation 
between personnel and cost over time is revealed in Exhibit 8.  As can be seen by this 
exhibit, Vietnam had a total of 8.7 million active-duty military personnel who served in 
the operation covering a 13-year time-span in comparison to operations in Southwest 
Asia (SWA) that covered a 10-year period and had only 30,000 active-duty military 
personnel who served in the operation during that time-span.    













































































Exhibit 8: Total Cost of Operations and Active Duty Military 
Personnel In-Theater. After [Ref. 41, 43, & 44]
 
       Notes: 
*Operation Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Desert 
Strike, Desert Fox.  
** OEF/OIF in FY’02 dollars. 
 
A descriptive analysis of other independent variables (e.g., technology, 
component structure, equipment, and firepower) is beyond the scope of this research but, 
in terms of contracting, the direct relationship between time, personnel and cost reveal 
that these variables are the largest contributing factors to contracting costs.  Evidence of 
this relationship is provided in a breakdown of cost per person per day for each conflict 
as depicted in Exhibit 9.  
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Exhibit 9: Total Cost of Operations per/Person per /Day. After  [Ref. 41, 43, & 44]  
Notes: 
*Operation Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Strike, 
Desert Fox.  
** OEF/OIF in FY’02 dollars. 
 
A statistical description of the data points contained in Exhibit 9 is derived from 
the following formula: 
 
Total Cost
Total # of Personnel in the Operation Cost per person per day
(Duration in years * 365)
=  
This formula helps delineate that the ratio of dollars to personnel supported has increased 
over time.  Exhibit 9 shows the highest cost per person of approximately $315.00 per day, 
per person, during current operations in support of OEF/OIF.  Given this information, one 
can reasonably determine that this is due to the increased contract cost for supplies and 





The foundation of Chapter III provides historical data from which to conduct a 
comparative analysis of the growing role of contracting on the battlefield.  In terms of 
personnel involved and costs, support for the prosecution of objectives in support of NSS 
is an important factor.  It is this personnel and cost linkage that provides the baseline 
analysis presented in this chapter as the foundation from which Chapter IV’s comparative 



























































IV. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING FROM 1992-2003 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes contingency contracting actions taken from 1992 through 
2003.  It explains the institutionalization of contracting on today’s battlefield over the 
past decade as well as through the logistical requirements for Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF).  Strengths and weaknesses in direct relation to the Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan (CCSP) are discussed.  Lastly, it highlights lessons learned and potential 
issues that could be addressed by Department of Defense (DoD) planners to consider the 
extent to which contracting is fully integrated into Joint Operational Plans (OPLANs). 
 
B. CONTRACTING ON TODAY’S BATTLEFIELD  
The ability to prosecute warfare in support of operational units has evolved over 
time.  In terms of contracting support on today’s battlefield, “lessons learned throughout 
our country's history…[demonstrated] that contracting and outsourcing can be effective 
force multipliers.”  [Ref. 45]  From a logistical perspective, this ‘Revolution in Military 
Affairs’ has also proven that “contracted capability can increase or decrease available 
support resources quickly in response to changing requirements,” by extending existing 
military capability, providing alternative sources of supplies, services, and capabilities for 
which no military capability exists...”[where] the Army may obtain substantial 
advantages and economies through contracted support.” [Ref. 45] As such, “contracting 
is a widespread and routine method for obtaining services today...for a variety of Base 
Operations (BASOPS) support activities, for common use functions” such as engineering 
support, transportation, and other base camp logistical requirements. [Ref. 45]  
This institutionalization of contractors on today’s battlefield for routine military 
operations has resulted in the establishment of doctrine for “determining what functions 
contractors can (or should) perform on the battlefield, where on the battlefield they 
should provide contracted services, and how…[to] employ them to perform the services.”  
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[Ref. 45] The ability to utilize “contractors to provide support and services to military 
operations is not without risks or costs” due to the lead time required to implement them 
in Joint operation planning. [Ref. 45] The ability to mitigate these risks, however, stems 
from involving Contracting Officers (COs) in Joint planning cells.  Their involvement in 
planning cells, according to Joe A. Fortner and Ron Jaeckle from the Combined Arms 
Support Command located at Fort Lee, Virginia, can provide better OPLAN 
responsiveness to any contingency.  Additionally, according to Fortner and Jaeckle, the 
guidelines that planners use for evaluating the desirability of using contractors on today’s 
battlefield in support of military operations are contained in the following principles:  
1. Contractors do not replace force structure. They augment Army capabilities 
and provide additional options for meeting support requirements.  
2. Contractors may, subject to mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time/space 
available, and civilian/logistics considerations (METT-TSCL), deploy 
throughout the area of operations (AO) and in virtually all conditions. In 
violent conditions in an echeloned theater, they generally will be assigned 
duties at echelons above division (EAD). In less violent circumstances, they 
may be employed throughout the theater depending upon the operational and 
tactical situation.  
3. Commanders are legally responsible for protecting contractors in their AO's.  
4. Contractors must have a sufficient number of employees available who have 
appropriate skills to meet potential sustained requirements.  
5. Contracted support must be integrated into the overall support plan.  
6. Contingency plans must accommodate service continuation if a contractor fails 
to perform.  
7. The user community should be unaware that a specific service was provided by 
a contractor. Links between Army and contractor automated systems must not 
place any additional burdens on soldiers.  
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8. The Army must remain capable of performing required battlefield functions to 
provide critical support before contractors arrive in the theater or in the event 
contractors do not deploy or cannot continue to provide contracted services.  
9. Although contractors can provide flexibility at the macro level, commanders 
must remain aware that, within a given operation, contractor use may decrease 
flexibility. Changing contractor functional activities to meet shifting 
operational requirements may require contract modifications, and some 
battlefield tasks cannot be assigned to contractors.  [Ref.  45] 
These nine basic principles provide a framework for developing doctrine for using 
contractors on the battlefield as well as emphasizing the importance of integrating 
contracting support within the Joint Planning Process (JPP).   
The applicability of contractor efforts on the battlefield can be addressed in terms 
of their function and growing role in supporting military operations.  As noted in Chapter 
III, contractors providing support to armies on the battlefield is not a new phenomena, 
however, the ability to effectively plan for contract support and implement them in the 
planning process has not always been done proactively but retroactively.  Exhibit 10 
shown below provides a detailed breakdown of contracting actions over the past decade 
and its role in current operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF.  
As can be seen, contracting services has evolved in importance due to the decline in 
































Base camp, engineering, 
maintenance, services,  
supplies, laundry, food 











Water production, storage, 
and distribution. 
 






Base camp construction, 










Services,  supplies, 
transportation, off-loading 
and storing containers from 
ships. 







Base camp construction. 
 








Base camp construction, 
services,  supplies, 
transportation, fuel, mail, 
































Base camp, engineering, 
maintenance, services, 
supplies, laundry, food 






Base camp construction, 
services, supplies, 
transportation, fuel, mail, 
sewage, water, seaport 
operations. 
Exhibit 10.  Contracts awarded for major operations.  After [Refs. 46 & 47]  
 
Note:  *FY’02 USD 
 
As can be seen in Exhibit 10, the role of contractors on the battlefield has 
increased considerably in the last decade.  They have provided essential support in the 
areas of “substantial support for combat service support CSS and some CS functions on 
the battlefield.” [Ref. 45] The support functions listed in Exhibit 10 entailed contracts 
awarded in support of major operations and have been synopsized into the three main 
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types of services provided:  1) Maintenance support, 2) Transportation support, and 3) 
Supply and services.  
It is evident that within the last decade, the increased use of contingency contracts 
for these functions has exponentially driven upwards the cost of support per person as 
detailed in Exhibit 11 below.  This provides a breakdown of the contracts awarded for 
major operations since Operation Restore Hope (ORH) and continues through to present 
day operations involved with OEF and OIF.   






































































Exhibit 11:Total Contracted Costs for Operations (1992-2002).. After [Refs. 46 & 47]
 
Given the data from Exhibit 11 and using the given equation to estimate cost per 
person per day: 
Total LOGCAP Cost
Total # of Personnel in the Operation Cost per person per day
(Duration in years * 365)
=  
It is this growing impact of contracting on the battlefield, as delineated in terms of its 
increasing importance, which is revealed in its cost per person per day, as shown in 
Exhibit 12 below. 
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Exhibit 12:Total Contracted Costs for Operations (1992-2002).. 
After [Refs. 46 & 47]  
 
  There are two types of contractors that today’s military forces primarily rely on; 
System and Contingency:   
 1.  System Contractors: Develop specific weapon systems and components 
during wartime or peacetime and are used for sustainment and maintenance management. 
[Ref.  45] 
 2.  Contingency Contractors: Provide logistical support services during operations 
in support of the Combatant Commander (COCOM).  They are able to provide support 
through either the existing umbrella of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) contracts in-theater or in operation-specific contracts that are limited to a 
specific AO.  [Ref.  45] 
  
The focus of this research, however, specifically concentrates on the contingency 
contracting aspect of battlefield contracting for both prearranged LOGCAP services and 
the operation-specific contractor.  For LOGCAP support contracts, “contractors provide 
prioritized contingency planning for logistics augmentation and engineering and 
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construction services” determined by the COCOM in the “affected AO's through the 
development of pre-arranged theater contracts negotiated in advance...permitting 
integrated contractor support into the support plans for anticipated contingencies.” [Ref. 
45] An area that can be strengthened involving LOGCAP support contracts is whether 
they are successfully integrated in support of the OPLAN and whether enough attention 
and accountability is provided during actual contract execution.  In contrast to LOGCAP 
support contracts, the operation-specific contractor “can provide many, if not all, of the 
same services that LOGCAP contractors perform” but the “significant difference is that 
these contracts are negotiated after the planning has begun for a specific 
contingency…[and] negotiated in-theater during pre-deployment activities or during the 
actual deployments.” [Ref. 45] A weakness of operation-specific contracting is that it 
provides “services under circumstances not previously arranged due to unanticipated 
requirements or conditions...and must be integrated into the overall support plan as they 
are developed.” [Ref. 45]   
Whether implementing an existing LOGCAP contract or negotiating a new 
operation-specific contract, the ability to integrate COs within the planning cells at the 
Joint-level can reinvigorate the ability of Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) to 
provide in-depth, realistic support for the COCOM.  During either the Deliberate 
Planning Process (DPP) involving LOGCAP contracts or Crisis Action Planning (CAP) 
involving operation-specific contracting, the role of the CO in the Joint Planning Process 
(JPP) should increase due to the growing use of contracting on the battlefield and the 
escalated monetary impact to support operational units in terms of contracting.  Early 
involvement of the CO in the JPP can provide the COCOM the flexibility and 
responsiveness to anticipate contracting requirements for deliberate or crisis action 
planning.  Based on this analysis, the following section will specifically address whether 
or not the inclusion of a Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) into the 
supporting plans of the OIF OPLAN is warranted.  It will reveal whether or not this 
integration of contracting capabilities has been effectively implemented in today’s Joint 
environment based on the strengths and weaknesses of the Contracting Appendix 
(Appendix 9) of the Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN Annex D) of the OIF OPLAN.   
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C. CURRENT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ACTIONS DURING OIF  
1. OIF OPLAN Annex D (Logistics) Analysis 
The increase in military actions over the past decade has resulted in the growing 
dependence by operating units on contracting support.  In terms of the merit of the OIF 
LOGPLAN, an analysis of its relative strengths and weaknesses in terms of contracting 
support are derived below in regard to the Contracting Appendix. 
        a.  Strengths 
       A review of the OIF LOGPLAN revealed, from a logistics standpoint, reveals 
the planning was sound in terms of the logistical performance measurements of 
responsiveness and flexibility at the strategic level of planning. [Ref. 48] According to 
Air Force Colonel Leonard Petrucelli, the chief of Defense Logistic Agency’s (DLA) 
Contingency Plans and Operations, success was driven by the fact that, “We've gotten out 
of the business of warehousing huge mountains of inventories, but we still manage small 
hills of critical and high-demand items… [ensuring that] the supplies are delivered 
straight to where the customer wants them, whether that's an office in Virginia, a pier in 
Kuwait, or an airfield inside Iraq.” [Ref. 49] This ability to provide advanced logistics 
planning centered on involving, “logisticians in the earliest planning… [which] 
contributed to the success of Iraqi Freedom." [Ref. 49] Colonel Petrucelli also stated, 
“What also helps us in this campaign is that we are now working hand in glove with the 
combat commanders and their planners to get out in front of the requirements, and that 
has been very beneficial because we have been in on the process early…[making] it 
easier to anticipate needs.”  [Ref. 50]  This success was due in large part to the 
embedding of “liaison officers at each combatant command, such as the U.S. Central 
Command, and the Joint Staff” for logistics planning. The anticipation of logistics in the 
early planning stages with “combat commanders improves communications and puts 
everyone in a better position to plan and sustain requirements."  [Ref. 50]   
         b. Weaknesses 
         In contrast to the overall logistical success of the LOGPLAN for OIF, a 
major concern from a contracting standpoint is the lack of detailed contract planning and 
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the omission of the CCSP from the LOGPLAN itself.  [Ref. 46]  This omission of the 
CCSP within the LOGPLAN created weaknesses that could have been remedied early on 
if involvement of a CCO within the Joint planning cells had been conducted.  Some of 
the more noticeable weaknesses are listed below: 
 (1) Transportation of Supplies.  The unprecedented length of logistics 
lines placed a strain on line haul assets.  A better alignment of the LOGPLAN with the 
CCSP could have increased line haul assets through the contracting of additional lift 
capabilities to augment Host Nation Support (HNS) and theater vehicles.  As such, “the 
delivery and build up of adequate sustainment to main effort units should have been a 
pre-condition to the displacement of other organizations.”  [Ref. 51]  
 (2) Combat Service Support (CSS) Organizations Deployed To Late In-
Theater. The Landing Force Shore Party (LFSP) had limited direct support CSS 
capability in-theater to provide support to arriving forces.  Additionally, war reserve 
sustainment blocks were not activated and sustaining stocks did not arrive in sufficient 
time.  Involvement of the CCO’s early on in the planning process could have ameliorated 
shortages not addressed by the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data List 
(TPFDDL).  [Ref. 51]    
 (3) Shortages of Class II, III, and IX Items.   According to planners, there 
was a shortage of consumable items across-the-board for Class II, Class III, and Class IX 
items.  This shortage of self-service items was overlooked and there was no concept to 
provide this support.  The ability to contract out for these supplies could have easily been 
accomplished by the CCO if provided adequate lead-time to plan for this in a properly 
framed CCSP. [Ref. 51]    
 
Congressional Supplemental Appropriations 
An increase in the Congressional supplemental appropriations (or total cost 
allocated per engagement) mirrors the length of engagement.  The longer the duration of 
the operation equates to its increased cost as can be seen for OIF.  Additionally, since the 
major force reductions in 1992, the ability to prosecute war has also seen increased 
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contracting costs in terms of contracted logistical and supply support.  The validity of 
increased contracting actions has been captured in several government studies since the 
conclusion of the first Gulf War.  According to a recent Government Accounting Officer 
(GAO) report published June 24, 2003, the DoD has, since the early 1990s, “used 
contractors to meet many of its logistical and operational support needs during combat 
operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance missions… [and] are 
used to support deployed forces at a number of locations around the world.” [Ref. 37] 
Listed below, Exhibit 13 captures current engagements prosecuted worldwide. 
 
Exhibit 13:  Current Operations.  From [Ref. 37] 
 
 The major force restructuring since 1992 has led to the increased number of 
awarded contracts as non-military essential tasks, to include supplies and services, were 
competed out in the open market.  The subsequent drawdown in the number of military 
personnel, coupled with increased operational tempo and deployments to regional hot 
spots has forced DoD to rethink its policies concerning support of the warfighter.  It can 
be interpreted from the data provided that the increase in deployments and number of  
contracts awarded in support of these operations have resulted in the increased amount of 
financial support appropriated by Congress in the form of supplemental budgets.  
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1. Contracts Awarded 
The need for Contingency Contracting on the battlefield is self-evident due to the 
increasing amount of contracting actions taken in operations since ODS/DS.  The major 
variables affecting cost of these operations are number of personnel, force structure, 
equipment supported, and time.  It has been noted that, “while [the] DoD and the military 
services cannot quantify the totality of support that contractors provide to deployed forces 
around the world, DoD relies on contractors to supply a wide variety of services.” [Ref. 
37]  The inherent trade-off between moving the “Iron Mountains” of logistical supplies 
and support are flexibility, responsiveness, and cost.  The ability of the CCO to provide 
this type of responsive support lies in the planning phases of an operation.  Additionally, 
it is this ability of the CCO to leverage time, which stems from the injection of CO’s 
early on within the JPP.  Only through the embedding of the CO’s within the Joint 
planning cells can this type of leverage be realized for the COCOM.   
 
D. OIF LESSONS LEARNED 
 The lessons learned from OIF depict the typical lack of institutional memory 
within DoD to learn from past engagements.  Additionally, contracting is only mentioned 
in the LOGPLAN in general terms.  The lack of congruence or ‘fit’ of the CCSP with the 
Logistics Annex of the OPLAN for OIF reveal that contracting is not fully integrated in 
the concept of operations.  In short, the CCSP is a disturbingly absent detail in terms of 
what it can provide in Appendix 9 of the LOGPLAN.  The purpose of the CCSP is to 
define the needs of the COCOM immediately so as to provide the CCO enough time to 
conduct battlefield procurement in an efficient and effective manner whether in a 
deliberate or crisis planning scenario.  This lack of integration places the warfighter at a 
disadvantage since precious time is lost when trying to integrate the CCSP in support of 
the OPLAN after the fact.  The use of LOGCAP contracts is an attempt to be proactive 
but the efforts fall short due to the lack of supervision and accountability in terms of what 
is actually required by the COCOM.  The ability to leverage time stems from the 
involvement of CO’s in the Joint planning cells at the beginning of the planning cycle 
and the integration of the CCSP with supporting plans within the Joint OPLAN.  As such, 
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it is this ability to leverage time early on that makes the CCSP a force-multiplier when 
contracting on the battlefield.  Furthermore, in terms of external coordination with other 
Joint entities such as the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) within the OPLAN, a 
review of Appendix 9 of the LOGPLAN reveals another weakness in terms of 
coordination and planning in terms of CCSP and CMOC coordination.  In sum, the 
CMOC is “an ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant 
commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of 
activities of engaged military forces, and other U.S. Government agencies, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and regional and international organizations.”  [Ref. 
52] 
      Although situation dependent, there is no established structure for the CMOC in 
terms of and its size and composition.  However, its impact in terms of coordination and 
planning with contracting elements of the CCSP can also adversely affect the type of 
support required by minimizing competition with these regional, international and 
nongovernmental organizations for scarce resources in-theater.  De-conflicting 
competition for these scarce resources via the CMOC can reduce costs if planned 
accordingly within the CCSP framework.  This coordination ultimately affects costs in 
terms of Congressional outlays.  Additionally, it is increased supplemental actions taken 
by Congress to delineate the cost of going to war along the spectrum of warfare where 
duration (or time) is the largest contributing variable that can be minimized through 
appropriate planning and coordination.  As can be seen in the previous exhibits, the 
increase of Congressional supplemental appropriations has also risen since ODS/DS in 
terms of contracting support throughout operations executed on a global scale.   
 
E. SUMMARY 
The contingency contracting actions taken during OIF suggest a lack of thorough 
planning and integration of the CCSP with the Logistics Annex of the OPLAN. 
Evidentiary material such as Appendix 9 of the Logistics Annex addressed contracting 
issues only in general terms.  The broad brushstrokes of this appendix gave consideration 
to issues such as the logistical tracking of contracted items and reporting elements in the 
45
logistical arena but failed to mention the essential internal communication and 
coordination between CO’s and supported units as well as external communication and 
coordination with such elements such as NGOs and other coalition forces when 
competing for scarce resources. 
 Contingency contracting in light of these terms was not even an afterthought.  As 
such, a time-series analysis was conducted, as shown in Exhibits 10, 11, and 12, to 
provide evidence of the growing importance of contracting on the battlefield. This 
analysis was described in terms of the number of contracts awarded and growing number 
of supplemental appropriations awarded by Congress due to increased spending in 
support of past and current operations over time.  The results of this analysis support the 
increased role of contracting in support of operations along the spectrum of conflict.  
Additionally, the evolving of the role of the CCSP within the JPP highlights its growing 
importance in direct relation to lessons learned from OIF.  This chapter described these 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
A. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis described the growing role of contingency contracting on the 
battlefield as well as the importance of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan 
(CCSP) within the Joint Planning Process (JPP).  This chapter provides conclusions 
regarding the emerging importance of the CCSP within the Department of Defense 
(DoD) based on contingency contracting data presented in earlier chapters.  According to 
sources in a recent study concerning Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), “the conflict in Iraq 
highlighted the difficulties the Defense Department faces in managing contractors on the 
battlefield.” (Ref. 51)  Based on this type of information provided, it makes 
recommendations on how DoD, higher echelon planners could enhance planning 
processes to provide a more robust, responsive, and flexible contingency contracting 
support to troops in-theater.  The chapter ends with areas for further research within the 
field of contingency contracting. 
 
B.        CONCLUSIONS 
The historical data in Chapter III and the analysis in Chapter IV identified and 
discussed limitations within the JPP in terms of delineating contracting support on the 
battlefield.  It also highlighted the importance of the nominal cost of support in terms of 
supplies and services contracted for troops in-theater.  Specifically, conclusions 
summarizing these major deficiencies within the OIF Operation Plan (OPLAN) are listed 
below. 
1. There is a lack of integration of Contracting Officers (COs) within the 
Joint Planning Cells.  As evident in a time-series analysis conducted, as 
shown in Exhibits 10, 11, and 12, battlefield contracting is becoming 
paramount.  When COs can be actively involved in the Joint Planning 
Cells the growing number of contracts awarded and the growing number 
of supplemental appropriations awarded by Congress can be more 
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effectively used by the Combatant Commander (COCOM) in support of 
operations along the spectrum of conflict.   
2. There is a lack of contracting details in the OIF Logistics Annex.  The 
contingency contracting actions taken during OIF suggest a lack of 
thorough planning and integration of the CCSP with the Lagistics Annex 
of the OPLAN.  The omission of a detailed CCSP within the LOGPLAN 
creates weaknesses that can be avoided if involvement of a CCO within 
the Joint planning cells are conducted.  This includes transportation of 
supplies, Combat Service Support (CSS) organizations deployed to the 
theatre too late, and shortages of Class II, III, and IX items. 
3. There is an increasing number of contracts awarded and 
supplemental funds appropriated.  There is a direct relationship 
between time, personnel and cost in regard to contracting costs.  These 
variables are the largest factors to contracting costs and evidence of this 
relationship was provided in Exhibit 9 where a breakdown of cost per 
person per day was depicted.  Bearing in mind the longer the duration of 
the operation equates to its increased cost as can be seen for OIF.  
Additionally, since the major force reductions in 1992, the ability to 
prosecute war has also seen increased contracting costs in terms of 
contracted logistical and supply support along the spectrum of warfare 
(e.g. Lesser Regional Conflict, Major Regional Conflict, Major Theater 
War). 
   
C.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the DoD undergoes needed transformation mandated by senior leadership, the 
planning processes must be adapted to adequately coordinate contracting support on the 
battlefield.  For example, during OIF, “it became confusing to commanders to determine 
exactly what the contractors were supposed to do.” (Ref. 51)  Furthermore, “of particular 
concern is the inability to track and oversee growing numbers of contractors” while in-
theater. (Ref. 51)  According to Colonel James Chamber, U.S. Army, “nobody in the 
service knew how many contractors were employed for Operation Iraqi Freedom…there 
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was no single source collecting, either in the theater or outside the theater, [information 
about] how many contractors we have” (Ref. 51) Additionally, a recent Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) report “criticized the Pentagon for failing to include contractor 
support in its operational and strategic plans.”  (Ref. 51)  Within this context, the 
following recommendations are provided to allow a framework for planning within the 
DoD by ensuring a greater role of the CCSP within Joint OPLANs. 
1. Establish a CCSP format.  Having a consistent format can provide 
planning across different military services a common starting point to 
conduct contract planning in a joint environment.  
2. Establish the CCSP as a Separate Annex within the Joint OPLAN.  
Having a CCSP as a separate Annex within the Joint OPLAN can ensure 
planning processes are in place to provided coordinated, effective 
battlefield contacting support  
3. Establish a Historical Database of frequently used Supplies and 
Services to build a CCSP Template.  Having a templated CCSP 
available, using historical data, can provide a proactive approach for future 
contingencies.  Realizing each contingency will be unique having the 
historical data, readily available, can provide the CO a baseline from 
which to start planning. 
 
D.        REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The following research questions provided a framework from which to conduct an 
analysis of the growing importance of the CCSP within the JPP.  As such, according to 
sources, “the use of contractors to support deployed forces around the world has 
increased significantly since the 1991 Gulf War.” (Ref. 51)  It is this significance that 
provides a context from which to conduct an analysis of the JPP and the use of CCSPs 
within Joint OPLANs for OIF.  Additionally, a foundation was established for 
comparative analysis based on historical data based on costs and number of troops 
supported since World War I (WWI) as well as the use of Logistics Civilian 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts over the past decade using contingency 
contracting until present day. 
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1. Primary Research Question 
 What is an expanded role of Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSP) in 
the Joint Planning Process (JPP), specifically relating to supporting Logistics Plans 
(LOGPLANS) and Operation Plans (OPLANS)? Why does the JPP, in regard to 
planning, not include CCSPs as an annex within the Joint OPLANS or as an appendix 
within the Joint LOGPLANS?  The expanded role of the CCSP in the JPP, specifically 
relating to supporting LOGPLANS and OPLANS, can provide the COCOM the requisite 
oversight of contractors on the battlefield.  Additionally, issues concerning the 
coordination and responsiveness of contracted support can result in a more flexible 
LOGPLAN in support of the OPLAN.  As such, the JPP, does not include CCSPs as an 
annex within Joint OPLANS or as an appendix within Joint LOGPLANS in past 
operations due to the evolving role of contractors on the battlefield.  It is the growing role 
of contractors on today’s battlefield that lends credence to the formal inclusion of the 
CCSP within the JPP. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What does the JPP entail?  What is the extent of integration between 
LOGPLANS and OPLAN?  The JPP entails detailed inputs from units at all levels as to 
the readiness and availability of personnel and equipment via the Time-Phased Force and 
Deployment Density List (TPFDDL).  As such, the extent of coordination between 
LOGPLANS and the OPLAN is mission dependent and is directly related to the readiness 
and the availability of personnel and equipment.   
b. What can CCSPs offer logistical planners by its formal inclusion into Joint 
OPLANS/LOGPLANS?  Additionally, what level of detail does the CCSP offer?  Can it 
provide leverage for the Combatant Commander (COCOM) to consolidate requirements, 
“certify” legitimate buyers due to security requirements, and de-conflict procurement 
with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)?  CCSPs (e.g. the CCSP template) can 
provide logistical planners a vehicle to address the contracting needs of the COCOM.  
However, this only addresses the immediate problem of the lack of contract coordination.  
The systemic problem can be fixed by the inclusion of a Contracting Officer within the 
Joint planning cells to provide guidance in terms of procurement policies and regulations 
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in order to legally obligate funds to a government contractor.  The formal inclusion of the 
CCSP within Joint OPLANS/LOGPLANS can offer logistical planners the necessary 
details of what can be contracted out in support of the mission.  Planning for the 
necessary Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT) can provide flexibility and 
responsiveness for contracted logistical support.  It is this PALT that can provide 
leverage for the COCOM, conduct effective market research and de-conflict the 
procurement of scarce resources with NGOs. 
c. How should the CCSP be formally included into the JPP, e.g., as a 
separate annex within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution (JOPES) 
OPLAN/CONPLAN format; contained within the LOGPLAN Annex (Annex D)?  This 
research indicates that the CCSP should be formally included within the JPP as a separate 
annex within the JOPES OPLAN/CONPLAN format.  If listed as a separate annex, the 
CCSP would provide the COCOM the necessary visibility of all available contracting 
actions to be undertaken within the Area of Operations (AO).  In contrast, if contained as 
an appendix within the LOGPLAN, the CCSP would not receive the requisite attention in 
respect to the accountability of dollars spent for contracts awarded.  
d. What is the changing role of Contracting Officers (CO) in terms of formal 
inclusion in Joint level planning cells, including in-theatre assessments and Combatant 
Commanders (COCOM) intent?  The changing role of the CO within Joint level planning 
cells would provide the COCOM the necessary “reality check” of what is available in-
theater.  Specifically, the CO could provide the planners the necessary market research of 
available resources to be contracted while in-theater.  The CO could delineate the 
availability of resources in a mature or immature contracting environment in support of 
mission objectives for the COCOM. 
e. How can coordination between the Civil Military Operations Center 
(CMOC) and COs be improved?   The coordination between the CMOC and CO’s can be 
improved through the inclusion of the CCSP within the JPP.  It is this inclusion of the 
CCSP within the JPP that can de-conflict the procurement of scarce resources with the 
CMOC and lead to the better utilization of in-country resources to aid in the 
reconstruction of local population centers after the abatement of hostilities. 
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E.       AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. The Increased use of the CO in Multi-national Operations.  The 
increased use of the CO in multi-national operations has its roots in the 
recent reconstruction efforts in post-war Iraq.  As such, it is this “nation 
building” effort within a multi-national context that the use of CO can 
provide the requisite expertise and responsive/responsible obligation of 
funds to support reconstruction.  Additionally, laws, statutes, and 
regulations are already in place to hold the CO accountable for the 
obligation of government funds necessary for rebuilding. 
2. Contracting Liaison with the United Nations (UN).  The UN has a solid 
history of providing support to war-torn countries.  Establishing a 
contingency contracting liaison with UN agencies can provide a “seamless 
hand-off” of reconstruction efforts at the end of hostilities.  Additionally, 
Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) can provide the necessary 
market research information for UN agencies to take advantage of when 
continuing reconstruction efforts. 
3. Training of Contracting Specialists and CO's at the Multi-national 
level.  As the recent war with Iraq has shown, the U.S. cannot go it alone 
when prosecuting war and in the subsequent rebuilding efforts.  Providing 
Contracting Specialists and CO’s the necessary skills to operate in a multi-
national environment would provide them the situational awareness to 
effectively provide support to the needs of coalition forces.  Their 
integration at the multi-national level would also encourage seamless 
contract support in terms of services, supplies, and logistics with follow-
on UN agencies. 
4. International Law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
jurisdiction when contractors are operating on the battlefield.  During 
hostilities with Iraq, there has been much deliberation on how to hold 
contractors accountable for their actions or inactions in terms of support to 
the forces in-theater.  What can CO’s do to ensure compliance of contracts 
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in a hostile environment?  How are contractors held accountable for non-
conformance of contractual obligations?  Will they be prosecuted under 
international law or the UCMJ when lives are at stake? 
 
 F. SUMMARY 
 The focus of this thesis was to highlight the Joint Planning Process (JPP), in 
regard to planning, does not include Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSPs) as 
an annex within Joint Operation Plans (OPLANs) or Joint Logistics Plans (LOGPLANs).  
Current OPLANS at the Joint-level touch on in-theatre contracted support but are not 
specific enough in the JPP.  This project analyzed the effectiveness of the Joint OPLANS 
with respect to contracting relationships in a contingency contracting environment.   
Inclusion of a CO in the planning cells can ensure proactive, responsive and 
flexible support of the OPLAN in a timely manner.  A well-written CCSP can incorporate 
the probability of success where supported units can concentrate on the prosecution of 
operations.  However, the CCSP is not always factored into the planning process, and 
supporting units may end up reacting to events that could have been avoided.  It can also 
be argued that the growing importance of the CCSP should result in it playing a more 
prominent role in the planning process as a separate annex of the OPLAN and not an 
appendix to the LOGPLAN annex.   The purpose of the CCSP is to define the needs of 
the COCOM immediately so as to provide the CO enough time to conduct battlefield 
procurement in an efficient and effective manner.  The use of LOGCAP contracts is an 
attempt to be proactive but the efforts fall short in terms of what is actually required by 
the COCOM.  The ability to leverage time stems from the involvement of CO’s in the 
Joint planning cells from the beginning of the planning cycle and the integration of the 
CCSP with supporting plans within the Joint OPLAN.  It is this ability to act early that 
makes the CCSP a force-multiplier when contracting on the battlefield; resulting in better 
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